Albert Einstein 24 April I cannot conceive of a personal God who would directly influence the actions of individuals, or would directly sit in judgment on creatures of his own creation. I cannot do this in spite of the fact that mechanistic causality has, to a certain extent, been placed in doubt by modern science. My religiosity consists in a humble admiration of the infinitely superior spirit that reveals itself in the little that we, with our weak and transitory understanding, can comprehend of reality.
Grass seems green to me. The sky appears to me to be blue.
Limiting yourself to propositions that are self-evident, evident to the senses or incorrigible, you can expand this list as exhaustively as you like. We have enough in E to make our case. Given E as evidence, can CF be inferred?
Is E adequate evidence for CF? Indeed all of the propositions in E are irrelevant to the truth of CF. E simply cannot logically support CF. So, CF is not self-evident, evident to the senses or incorrigible, nor can CF be inferred from a set of propositions that are self-evident, evident to the senses or incorrigible.
So, CF, by its own account, is irrational. If CF were true, it would be irrational to accept it. Better simply to reject it!
Thomas Reidwhom Plantinga and Wolterstorff follow, was an early critic of classical foundationalism. Reid argued that we have been outfitted with a host of cognitive faculties that produce beliefs that we can reason from the foundations of believings.
Plantinga calls these basic beliefs.
The kinds of beliefs that we do and must reason to is a small subset of the kinds of beliefs that we do and must reason from. The latter must be accepted without the aid of proof. In most cases we must rely on our intellectual equipment to produce beliefs in the appropriate circumstances, without evidence or argument.
For example, we simply find ourselves believing in other persons. A person is a center of self-conscious thoughts and feelings and first-person experience.
Consider a person, Emily, whose leg is poked with a needle. We can see Emily recoil and her face screw up, and we can hear her yelp. The experience of pain is just the sort of inner experience that is typical of persons.
Or, for all we know, Emily might be a person just like us with the characteristic interior life and experience of persons.
No one has ever been able to develop a successful argument to prove that there are other persons. So if classical foundationalism were true, it would not be reasonable to believe in the existence of other persons.
But surely there are other persons whose existence it is reasonable to accept. So much the worse for classical foundationalism, Reidians say. Similar problems arise for classical foundationalism concerning beliefs in the past, the future, and the external world.
No justification-conferring inference is or could be involved. Yet, the Reidian claims, we are perfectly within our epistemic rights in holding these basic beliefs. Granting that a great many of our important beliefs are non-inferential, could one reasonably find oneself believing in God without evidence or argument?
Could belief in God be properly basic? There are at least two reasons to believe that it might be rational for a person to accept belief in God without the support of an argument.
The first is a parity argument.
We must, by our nature, accept the deliverances of our cognitive faculties, including those that produce beliefs in the external world, other persons, that the future will be like the past, the reality of the past, and what other people tell us—just to name a few.
For the sake of parity, we should trust the deliverances of the faculty that produces in us belief in the divine what Plantingafollowing John Calvin, calls the sensus divinitatus, the sense of the divine.
Of course, some philosophers deny that we have a sensus divinitatus and so reject the parity argument. The second reason is that belief in God is more like belief in a person than belief in a scientific hypothesis. Human relations demand trust, commitment, and faith.
If belief in God is more like belief in other persons than belief in atoms, then the trust that is appropriate to persons will be appropriate to God. Religious Experience Although Plantinga contends that belief in God does not require the support of propositional evidence or argument like a theistic proof in order to be rational, he does contend that belief in God is not groundless.The term panentheism (meaning "all-in-God") was coined by German idealist philosopher Karl Christian Friedrich Krause (), in the process of replacing scholarly notions of the transcendent God with a more participatory notion of the divine.
Derived from the Greek words pan (all), en (in) and theos (God), this term refers to the belief that the world is in God, who in turn is in the world. Can You Believe It's True?: Christian Apologetics in a Modern and Postmodern Era [John S.
Feinberg] on torosgazete.com *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Truth? Can we know it? Many people today would say no–we can’t. This paradigmatic shift to relativism presents a direct challenge to the Christian’s witness and the challenge must be answered.
“The world behind me, the cross before me, no turning back, no turning back.” These words from the old gospel song “I have decided to follow Jesus,” make clear the situation of the moment. McDermott, Gerald Robert: Civil Religion in the American Revolutionary Period: An Historiographic Analysis: XVIII: 4: McDonald, H.
Dermot: Hope: Human and Christian. God Defined - Quotes about god by famous people. In the Beginning, the Universe was created. This has made a lot of people very angry and has been widely regarded as a bad move. New Age Religions. New Age spirituality is characterized by an individual approach to spiritual practices and philosophies, while rejecting religious doctrine and dogma.